


# When your shave better be close



© Sunbeam ©1967 Sunbeam Corporation

## get a Sunbeam Shaver



Nothing shaves as close as blades. And only Sunbeam has six real blades. Under two close-fitting rounded heads. So they shave really close—even in the hard-to-reach spots flat shavers can't touch. Is Sunbeam the perfect shaver? Nothing comes closer.



built with integrity, backed by service

## KENNEDY CONTINUED

"about two percent are casualties caused by air attacks."

There is no question that the bombing makes infiltration much more difficult. But all of North Vietnam is a long supply trail that, as in Korea, has not been severed from the air. Again according to Secretary McNamara, the Vietcong and North Vietnamese forces in the South require "significantly under 100 tons a day" of military materials (other than food) from the North, "a quantity that could be transported by only a few trucks"—or even 400 bicycles. At any rate, bombing of the infiltration trails in Laos would not have been affected by a halt in the bombing of North Vietnam.

Finally and most importantly, it has been argued that we cannot halt the bombing without a sizable military concession first being made by our adversaries: as President Johnson put it in his February letter to Ho Chi Minh, "I am prepared to order a cessation of the bombing against your country and the stopping of further augmentation of U.S. forces in South Vietnam as soon as I am assured that infiltration into South Vietnam by land and by sea has stopped." (In 1966, we had halted the bombing without such a demand.)

"Stopping bombing is not peace  
but only part of a plan for  
negotiations and settlement."

**W**ITHOUT FURTHER SUPPORT of any kind, Hanoi's 50,000 regular troops in the South would be hard-pressed and at a significant military disadvantage before the 400,000 Americans already there, especially since our great superiority of firepower could be indefinitely maintained by ship and plane. Thus, our February, 1967, terms, still our official position, were in effect a demand for the North Vietnamese to withdraw their forces, to abandon the Vietcong in the South. This was quite clearly understood in the highest circles of our Government at the time. In the winter of 1966-67, important United States officials felt we were on the brink of a military victory, that our position was considerably stronger and that of our adversaries considerably weaker than had been true a year before. Therefore, they thought, we could afford to stiffen our position. And we did.

Our public pronouncements at this time were very different; publicly, we wanted "just almost any step" in return for a bombing halt. If such a small step is at issue, should it be allowed to determine such a weighty matter? In fact, as was apparent from the President's letter when it was released in March, our actual demands have been much more serious than our public statements have indicated.

Objective assessment of the prospects for a negotiated settlement rests on clear analysis of the minimum goals of both sides, our adversaries' as well as our own. To say that North Vietnam "cannot" negotiate while bombs are falling on Hanoi is not an approbation if its refusal to come to the conference table but merely a prediction that as long as the bombs fall, the war will go on. And to say that the bombing will not cease until we are "assured that infiltration into South Vietnam by land and by sea has stopped" is only to ensure that bombing and infiltration will continue, that there will be no negotiations, and that the war will go on.

It was for these reasons—because I felt that the bombing of the North was a major obstacle to negotiations, that it could have been halted at a relatively small risk to ourselves, and that a halt would have demonstrated, to our own people and the world, our interest in a peaceful solution—that I urged in the winter of 1966-67 that we test the sincerity of the statements by Premier Kosygin and the others by halting the bombing and stating our immediate readiness to negotiate. I said then, as I continue to believe, that "the bombing of the North cannot bring an end to the war in the South; rather that it may well be prolonging the war." And while I feel the possibilities of fruitful negotiations to be significantly less than existed in the winter and spring of 1967, I still feel the effort to reach them should be made.

Stopping the bombing, however, is not peace. Rather, it would be only one part of a coordinated plan for negotiations and settlement. The next step in such a plan would be to ensure that negotiations would not be used as a device for either side to change the military balance. It is unrealistic to expect the North to cease its *present* support for its own troops and the Vietcong, just as it would be for us to stop supplying our forces in the South; but it would be equally unrealistic to expect that peace can be discussed effectively or with confidence while casualties mount and the war gets bigger. Immediately after a halt in the bombing, and with or without specific agreement from the North Vietnamese,



international teams under the United Nations or a strengthened International Control Commission, or even some other international group established especially for this purpose, should be asked to provide detached and objective information to the world about any large buildup of troops or supplies by either side during the peace talks. Then if the failure of negotiations, coupled with the actions of our adversary, made it necessary for us to reexamine our position, we would act with far clearer international understanding of our motives and necessities.

Moreover, once at the conference table, our problem would in a sense be more difficult. Negotiations are not the end of the road but only a bridge to the future of South Vietnam. The negotiators must develop a program to dismantle the war: to establish procedures for a cease-fire, for the laying down of arms and for the gradual withdrawal of foreign forces—and all this accompanied by the political steps necessary to protect the safety of all sides while the war is being dismantled.

It is these political steps—the resolution of South Vietnam's tangled politics—that have always been at the heart of the problem of peaceful settlement. Further, this question is central even to the preliminary problem of arriving at serious negotiations. Stopping the bombing may bring Hanoi to negotiations. But the NLF seeks more than a halt to bombing in the North; it seeks a role in the South. Whether the NLF would come to negotiations, and the position it would take there, will almost certainly depend in large part on the terms of political settlement that are understood to be possible. Those terms—that is, the areas of possible compromise, and our own goals in South Vietnam—must therefore first be clear in our own minds.

What should those terms be? A military victory is not in sight for anyone. Any settlement must therefore be a compromise that, however imperfect, would protect the self-determination of the Vietnamese people. Communist and non-Communist, Buddhist and Christian, should be able to choose their leaders and seek office through peaceful political processes, free from external coercion and internal violence. All should have the opportunity to seek peacefully a share of power and responsibility, preferably through free elections. They should determine their future and the nature of their system and resolve the question of Vietnamese reunification.

The first step would be for the South Vietnamese Government, as well as other political elements not represented in it, to begin its own discussions with the NLF. If the people of South Vietnam are to settle their own future, they must at least begin to talk to each other. Undoubtedly, a cease-fire would allow this process to begin at the village and hamlet level, aiming toward village elections in which all sides, including the NLF, could freely participate.

I have always felt that the United States must also be ready to talk directly to all parties—not only with Hanoi but directly with the NLF in the South. If the NLF men are independent, we should talk to them. If they are not, it makes no difference that they are at the conference table with North Vietnam. The only objection to their participation is that it would confer status upon them. They have already achieved more status on the battlefield than we could give them at the conference table.

It was and is essential that non-Communist Vietnamese take a major role in discussions leading to a negotiated settlement, and exert effective


continued



LOOK 11-28-67

"You've got to give them credit. They're trying to come up with something."

# When sideburns are important



©Sunbeam ©1967 Sunbeam Corporation

## give a Sunbeam Shaver



Sunbeam introduced the first successful barber-type trimmer. And it's still the best trimmer in the business. Gives you neat, straight sideburns every time. Clips away stray long hairs, too. Tired of scraggly sideburns?

Get a Sunbeam Shaver. And put an end to them.



built with integrity, backed by service



# KENNEDY CONTINUED

force and influence in competition with the NLF for future leadership. The effectiveness of their participation in negotiations will largely depend on the extent to which they have the confidence of their own people and represent their aspirations. Therefore, the character of the 1967 elections is undoubtedly a handicap to fruitful peace talks. Had there been a free political process during the spring and summer of 1967, it undoubtedly would have broadened the final government to include other elements of South Vietnamese society, thus making it clear to Hanoi and the NLF that they were faced with a formidable negotiating adversary, which represented the choice and objectives of the non-Communist majority in South Vietnam. As much as possible, however, that opportunity must be reopened: most particularly by broadening the base of the present Saigon government and curbing the arbitrary use of police powers and censorship. If the present ruling group is all that is allowed to compete with the Communists, the Vietcong would certainly dominate the peace.

Finally, a lasting settlement of the war requires that free elections open to all would ultimately be held and that those who won them would take office. Confidence will depend on the structure of government between the end of hostilities and elections—perhaps a prolonged period. The Communists would fear a take-over by the military, just as we might fear a Communist coup. Thus, during the interim period between the end of hostilities and elections, it will be necessary to establish a ruling structure in which both sides have confidence. There are many possible ways of achieving this. It may be desirable to formulate a series of international guarantees, agreed upon by the major powers as well as by the combatants, perhaps by establishing an international supervisory force. To the extent the South Vietnamese share in this interim administration, it will be necessary for all important elements in the country to have a share of power and responsibility. Details of an exact formula must await actual negotiations. The important thing is that it provide enforceable and unbreakable guarantees against fraudulent elections and any attempt, by either side, to take power without or despite the elections.

In any case, it is clear that unless we accept the principle of Vietcong participation in any interim government structure, albeit under international supervision or as part of an international framework, there is little hope for success in any negotiations. When I first made this proposal, in February of 1966, it was attacked by some officials of the Administration. The President's press secretary, however, later stated that the United States did not foreclose such participation. It did not, he said, guarantee the principle of NLF participation in an interim government, but felt that the issue should be left to the negotiators. This, in my view, was a step forward, though insufficient, especially in light of statements by Marshal Ky that he would not accept an NLF role in the government even as a result of free and fair elections.

The kind of program I have outlined is no fixed or frozen formula; continued



LOOK 11-28-67

"Where are the parents when these kids are out protesting?"

Even if I cost just pennies  
more than beer, I look,  
taste and sparkle  
like champagne.



You and your  
"bubblier-than-thou"  
attitude.

# CHAMPAGNE®

... LIKE NOTHING ELSE YOU EVER TASTED (EXCEPT CHAMPAGNE)

FREE—Two exciting new recipe booklets. Write today to Metropolis Brewery of N.J., Inc., Trenton © Dept. L-3

LOOK 11-28-67 43



## KENNEDY CONTINUED

it is a set of suggestions, to be refined and revised by the critical examination of others; molded and reworked by shifting events, the responses of other nations, and the passions of people whose lives and homes are at stake. I do believe, however, that it points in a necessary direction.

It must be said that such a program involves risks. An adversary who lives may perhaps fight another day. A government that is not continuously sheltered by American military power may be again attacked or subverted or overthrown. But these are "risks" that we take every day, in a hundred countries in every corner of every continent—because we cannot occupy the world and because we do not wish to become a garrison state; and also because we believe men and nations will not willingly choose to submit to other men from other lands.

I have described the action I believe our Government should have taken earlier this year because there is much to be learned from the events of all these months. Most of all, they teach us that for either side to put off negotiations, in the hope of military victory that will avoid the later need for compromise, is a tragic mistake. The passage of time will cause costs and casualties to mount on both sides, while hope of a negotiated settlement is postponed to an uncertain future. The actions I have outlined, the principles on which negotiations and a settlement must be based, I believe are still valid today. But what is far less certain now is whether halting the bombing by itself will bring us to the negotiating table. Certainly, a mere "pause" of a few days or even weeks is highly unlikely to bring us to negotiations. Even a full halt in the bombing—if it is not accompanied by great skill, determination to reach a negotiated settlement, and, above all, a clear understanding of our own goals—will not bring peace.

I continue to believe that the effort for negotiations, including a halt in the bombing of North Vietnam, should be made. If the passage of substantial time and events proves that our adversaries do not sincerely seek a negotiated solution, if discussions are used only as a pretext to enlarge the conflict in the South, then we can reexamine our entire military strategy in light of the changing nature of the war. We should be generous in our search for peace; but also mindful of the precedent of

Panmunjom. We must also realize, however, that the success or failure of any effort for negotiations will depend, more than ever, on our attitude and overall position at the time—both our public position and that which we put forward in secret messages and conversations.



Further, we must realize that the hope of negotiations depends also on the position of our adversaries. Another year of combat and mounting destruction has almost certainly further hardened opinion in North Vietnam, much as in the United States it has led to successful calls for greater military action. Now, almost every target worth a bomb or a rocket has been struck. None can say whether an offer not to bomb what remains will be regarded by the North as worthwhile. Much of the population of Hanoi and Haiphong has already been evacuated.

Moreover, there are signs that our adversaries feel the war in the South is going favorably to their cause. They are receiving increased aid from the Soviet Union. Communist China has maintained tens of thousands of support personnel in North Vietnam. There are strong indications that they have been joined by technicians and "volunteers" from other Communist nations. Chinese airports are now being used for the North Vietnamese fighter planes, and North Koreans are flying them. Finally, our adversaries may feel that an offer of negotiation, so close to our own elections, would be intended primarily for political effect in the United States—or that if the offer is serious, the terms will become more favorable as November, 1968, gets closer.

We face an obdurate adversary, fired with hatred for the foreigner, backed, however reluctantly, by the great resources of the Soviet Union, with the masses of China looming behind. Our own vast resources, and even the great bravery of our soldiers, are able only to avert military defeat. Yet they do not preserve us as we were, for involvement and danger mount with every new day. Elsewhere, the world goes on increasingly apart from us, and events of great moment pass us by. At home, we are beset with dangers we hardly understand, as political leaders speak of our streets in a vocabulary learned from this faraway war.

But we are not trapped and hopeless. We are not paralyzed. We need not and cannot allow the decisions of others or the workings of an inscrutable

continued



## One more thing Toyota gives you is... America's lowest priced Hardtop

Not "one of the lowest" but the lowest priced hardtop in America. Toyota Corona 2-door hardtop. \$1995 poe.\* A price that includes loads of extras without extra cost: Sporty four-on-the-floor transmission, reclining bucket seats, fold-down rear seat for extra baggage room, plush all vinyl interior. It's all added on before the price. A quick,

smooth automatic transmission is available as an option. The Corona Hardtop has all the power and economy of Toyota's famous 4-door sedan: 90 hp engine, tops 90 mph, owners report up to 30 miles per gallon.

How does Toyota do it for **\$1995** poe\*? Beautifully!



Get your hands on a TOYOTA...you'll never let go!

**TOYOTA**  
**CORONA**





TOYOTA, Japan's No. 1 Automobile Manufacturer

\* White wall tires, accessories, options, freight & taxes extra.

Toyota Motor Distributors, Inc., Western Division, 2055 West 190th Street, Torrance, California 90501 / Toyota Motor Distributors, Inc., Eastern Division, 231 Johnson Avenue, Newark, New Jersey 07108 / Mid-Southern Toyota Ltd., 1640 North LaSalle Street, Chicago, Illinois 60614






## Let Mayflower give your belongings this kind of care when you move.

Our men are schooled and skilled in the art of moving. And they use special Mayflower methods and materials to pad, pack, and protect every item you own. For example, they use a special quilted cover—extra thick and soft—to protect your refrigerator, as well as your walls and woodwork. Moreover, our vans have modern air-ride suspension, to give your belongings a softer, safer ride to your new home. We're in your Yellow Pages. Call us when you move long distance.

© 1967, AERO MAYFLOWER TRANSIT CO., INC., INDIANAPOLIS



## KENNEDY CONTINUED

table fate to pull us blindly ahead. Nothing in our position is more dangerous than the often-heard statement that the future is all in the hands of our adversaries. Such fatalism is the worst surrender of all.

The truth is that there is much we can do, beginning with a change in attitude. We must recognize that the struggle in the South is just that—a struggle in the South. Such a reassessment would reach, at the outset, to the question of the Saigon government: ensuring its broadening to include now-unrepresented elements of the South Vietnamese people, such as Buddhist organizations, labor unions, intellectuals and civilian political leaders. With such an attitude, we would work to end harassment by the military and secret police, and restore the village and hamlet democracy. This process would begin by ensuring that district and province chiefs are locally elected and responsible to the people, ending the system of military appointment of these officials that is central to the network of corruption and misgovernment in the countryside.

Recognition of the war's real character would also ensure attention to a *serious* program of social reform: not a matter just of more billions in U.S. aid but primarily of justice and decency within Vietnamese society. It may be asked whether real social reform will not encounter strong resentment from the military and social ruling groups. Of course it will, as it has in the past. But if these reforms are not initiated, there is little prospect of success for our efforts, or wisdom or purpose for our presence. The worst danger of making this our war is that our stake in it becomes greater than that of the Saigon government. But it is their war, and they must understand that refusing the necessary reforms will have direct and severe consequences. President Kennedy said in 1963: "It is their war. They are the ones who have to win it or lose it. We can help them, we can give them equipment, we can send our men out there as advisers, but they have to win it, the people of Vietnam, against the Communists." Similarly, when President Eisenhower sent American troops to Lebanon in 1958, he ordered them to occupy only the capital and the main airport. "If the Lebanese Army were unable to subdue the rebels when we had secured their capital and protected their government," he has written, "we were backing up a government with so little popular support that we probably should not be there."

Continued support of a government that, after this long history and our patient effort, still refuses reform is not pragmatic or tough-minded. It is ideological self-deception and a surrender of American interests to a government that without our support would not survive a month. Moreover, these reforms will be necessary whether or not negotiations take place. In fact, it is only genuine progress in the South, beginning at last to attract the support of the people—and not greater destruction in the North—that offers a real prospect of convincing our adversaries that an early settlement is prudent.

Recognition of the character of the war would also affect our military effort, shifting its emphasis away from attacks on the North and combat by American forces toward greater reliance on South Vietnamese action in the South. This means less concentration on American sweeps and search and destroy missions, and more on physical protection of the densely populated areas near the coast and the Mekong Delta. If sweeps are considered to have military value, let them be carried out by the South Vietnamese. A greater share of the military effort at the demilitarized zone should be assumed by the Vietnamese, with American marines being gradually relieved. The government of South Vietnam should order the total mobilization that it has so far refused to put into effect and should begin to draft the tens of thousands who up to now have been able to avoid service. Thus, we can serve our stated objectives, while conserving and protecting American lives, limiting further destruction of the South Vietnamese people by Americans, and assuring real security in the important areas of the country now under control by our side. Lowering our cost, in money and lives, while making clear our intention of remaining, is one sure way of convincing our adversaries that we can and will remain until a satisfactory resolution is assured.

Finally, agony and interest, the limited nature of our goals and the formidable consequences of rising war combine to compel us to seek whatever new initiatives can resolve this conflict—honorably, justly, consistent with our aims, and in peace.

We owe no less to ourselves, to our people, and to those whose land we both protect and ravage. In that land, the stakes are very high: They are the home of the child in a jungle village, the hunger of a man driven from his farm, the life of a young American even now preparing for the day's battle. There is the national interest, and there is also human anguish. To protect the one and prevent the other, no effort is too great for us to make.

END